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  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
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  <updated>2026-09-28T09:47:43.379648+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-12537</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-12537 — Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Gemini CLI CI/CD Workflows</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T09:47:43.381627+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Google Cloud Gemini CLI, Google Cloud run-gemini-cli GitHub Action</p>
<p>Improper Neutralization used in an OS Command in the container launcher in Google Gemini CLI (versions prior to 0.39.1) and run-gemini-cli GitHub Action (versions prior to 0.1.22) on headless CI platforms allows an unprivileged attacker to achieve pre-sandbox host-level code execution a maliciously crafted .gemini/.env file.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-12537"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wpqr-6v78-jr5g</id>
    <title>GHSA-wpqr-6v78-jr5g — Gemini CLI: Remote Code Execution via workspace trust and tool allowlisting bypasses</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T09:47:43.381724+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @google/gemini-cli, GitHub Actions: google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli</p>
<p># Summary</p>
<p>Gemini CLI (`@google/gemini-cli`) and the `run-gemini-cli` GitHub Action are being updated to harden workspace trust and tool allowlisting, in particular when used in untrusted environments like GitHub Actions. This update introduces a breaking change to how non-interactive (headless) environments handle folder trust, which may impact existing CI/CD workflows under specific conditions.</p>
<p># Details</p>
<p>Folder Trust in Headless Mode</p>
<p>In previous versions, Gemini CLI running in CI environments (headless mode) automatically trusted workspace folders for the purpose of loading configuration and environment variables. This is potentially risky in situations where Gemini CLI runs on untrusted folders in headless mode (e.g. CI workflows that review user-submitted pull requests). If used with untrusted directory contents, this could lead to remote code execution via malicious environment variables in the local `.gemini/` directory.</p>
<p>To ensure consistency and user control, the latest update aligns headless mode behavior with interactive mode, requiring folders to be explicitly trusted before configuration files (such as `.env`) are processed.</p>
<p>As a result of this change, GitHub Actions and other automated pipelines that rely on the previous automatic trust behavior will fail to load workspace-specific settings until they are updated to use explicit trust mechanisms.</p>
<p>Tool Allowlisting under \--yolo</p>
<p>In previous versions, when Gemini CLI was configured to run in `--yolo` mode, i…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wpqr-6v78-jr5g"/>
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