CVE-2026-100689 — GitPython before 3.1.62 Path Traversal via gitmodules path

2026-10-02T17:59:05.385390+00:00

Affected: gitpython-developers GitPython

GitPython before 3.1.62 does not validate the `path` field read from an untrusted .gitmodules file when updating submodules. While a prior fix (GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) added Submodule._validated_name() to constrain the `name` field, and GitPython's own containment guard Submodule._to_relative_path() is applied in add() and move(), Submodule.update() derives the absolute checkout location from the raw `path` value without that guard. A .gitmodules entry containing directory traversal components (e.g., path = ../../../tmp/escaped) can therefore cause directories to be created via os.makedirs() outside the repository working tree, populated from the submodule URL on the clone path, and removed via shutil.rmtree() when force_remove is used. Exploitation requires an application flow that updates submodules at a non-HEAD commit (such as a historical-commit API); the common clone-then-update flow re-derives the path from a canonical tree lookup and is not affected. The issue is fixed in GitPython 3.1.62.

GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w — GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository

2026-10-02T17:59:05.385509+00:00

Affected: PyPI: GitPython

**Affected:** `GitPython` **3.1.61** (latest release) and `main` — `git/objects/submodule/base.py`. `git diff 3.1.61 origin/main -- git/objects/submodule/` is empty, so both are identical here.

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## The gap

The fix for `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc` added `Submodule._validated_name()` and wired it into `update()` and five siblings, closing the `.gitmodules` **name** → `.git/modules/` traversal. The other attacker-controlled `.gitmodules` field, **`path`**, is read raw:

```python # git/objects/submodule/base.py:172-177 def _set_cache_(self, attr): if attr in ("path", "_url", "_branch_path"): reader = self.config_reader() self.path = reader.get("path") # raw .gitmodules value ```

and GitPython's own containment guard is applied in only two of the places that consume it:

``` 400: def _to_relative_path(cls, parent_repo, path) # the guard (abspath + commonpath containment) 542: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path) # add() — guarded 1041: module_checkout_path = self._to_relative_path(self.repo, module_path) # move() — guarded ```

`update()` validates only the name and then uses the path-derived absolute location directly:

``` 788: self._validated_name(self.name) # NAME only 801: checkout_module_abspath = self.abspath # derived from self.path — unguarded 821: os.makedirs(checkout_module_abspath, exist_ok=True) ```

So `path = ../../../tmp/escaped` in an attacker-authored `.gitmodules` s…

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CVE-2026-100689 — GitPython before 3.1.62 Path Traversal via gitmodules path

GHSA-59cr-6r3x-644w — GitPython submodule update path traversal can write outside the repository