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  <updated>2026-11-17T15:32:47.560338+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-79783</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-79783 — rclone before 1.74.4 Privilege Escalation via setuid Metadata</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T15:32:47.562294+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> rclone</p>
<p>rclone before 1.74.4 fails to mask special permission bits when applying source-supplied mode metadata in the local backend, allowing attackers to set setuid/setgid bits on attacker-controlled files. When copying with metadata preservation from an untrusted remote, attackers can plant a setuid binary that escalates privileges to root if rclone runs as root, or to the service account user otherwise.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-79783"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-945v-v9p3-v5xw</id>
    <title>GHSA-945v-v9p3-v5xw — rclone local `--metadata` applies attacker-controlled mode/uid - setuid binary planted from an untrusted remote</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T15:32:47.562416+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/rclone/rclone</p>
<p>### Summary
When writing an object with metadata, the local backend applies the source-supplied `mode`, `uid`, and `gid` verbatim: it parses `mode` as an octal integer and passes it straight into `os.Chmod(o.path, os.FileMode(umode))`, and passes `uid`/`gid` straight into `os.Chown`. The value is never masked to permission bits, so any value with Go's `ModeSetuid` (1&lt;&lt;23) or `ModeSetgid` (1&lt;&lt;22) bit set causes the setuid/setgid bit to be applied. Because both the file content and its metadata come from the (attacker-controlled) source remote, an attacker stores a binary of their choosing with `mode = 40000755` (and `uid = 0`); when the victim runs `rclone copy -M &lt;remote&gt;: /dest`, rclone writes the attacker's binary and makes it setuid. If the victim runs rclone as root (typical for system backup/restore), the `uid=0` chown plus setuid produces a root-owned setuid binary with attacker content — any local user then escalates to root. When rclone runs as a non-root service user, the planted setuid binary is owned by that user, giving any local user that user's privileges (lateral escalation / persistent backdoor).</p>
<p>### Details
`backend/local/metadata.go`, `writeMetadataToFile()`:
```go
uid, hasUID := o.parseMetadataInt(m, "uid", 10)
gid, hasGID := o.parseMetadataInt(m, "gid", 10)
if hasUID {
    ...
    err = os.Chown(o.path, uid, gid)        // source-controlled owner, no same-uid guard
}
mode, hasMode := o.parseMetadataInt(m, "mode", 8)
if hasMode &amp;&amp; mode &gt;= 0 {
    umode :=…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-945v-v9p3-v5xw"/>
  </entry>
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