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  <updated>2026-11-19T18:08:07.494346+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2025-21834</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-21834 — seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering</title>
    <updated>2026-11-19T18:08:07.499676+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering</p>
<p>When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached
process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe.</p>
<p>The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp
filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known
syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp
to control their syscall surface.</p>
<p>Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is
not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and
there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to
explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes.</p>
<p>Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration.</p>
<p>Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be
supported in i386.</p>
<p>[kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2025-21834"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/usn-7379-1</id>
    <title>USN-7379-1 — linux, linux-aws, linux-azure, linux-gcp, linux-hwe-6.11, linux-oracle, linux-realtime vulnerabilities</title>
    <updated>2026-11-19T18:08:07.499780+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: linux-hwe-6.11</p>
<p>Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel.
An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:
  - ARM64 architecture;
  - MIPS architecture;
  - PowerPC architecture;
  - RISC-V architecture;
  - S390 architecture;
  - x86 architecture;
  - Block layer subsystem;
  - Compute Acceleration Framework;
  - ACPI drivers;
  - Drivers core;
  - Ublk userspace block driver;
  - Virtio block driver;
  - Bluetooth drivers;
  - Buffer Sharing and Synchronization framework;
  - DMA engine subsystem;
  - EFI core;
  - GPIO subsystem;
  - GPU drivers;
  - HID subsystem;
  - Microsoft Hyper-V drivers;
  - Hardware monitoring drivers;
  - I3C subsystem;
  - IIO ADC drivers;
  - IIO subsystem;
  - InfiniBand drivers;
  - IOMMU subsystem;
  - LED subsystem;
  - Multiple devices driver;
  - Media drivers;
  - Microchip PCI driver;
  - MTD block device drivers;
  - Network drivers;
  - Mellanox network drivers;
  - STMicroelectronics network drivers;
  - NVME drivers;
  - PCI subsystem;
  - PHY drivers;
  - Pin controllers subsystem;
  - x86 platform drivers;
  - i.MX PM domains;
  - Power supply drivers;
  - Voltage and Current Regulator drivers;
  - SCSI subsystem;
  - i.MX SoC drivers;
  - SPI subsystem;
  - UFS subsystem;
  - USB Gadget drivers;
  - TDX Guest driver;
  - AFS file system;
  - BTRFS file system;
  - Ceph distributed file system;
  - File systems infrastructure;
  - F2FS file system;
  - JFFS…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/usn-7379-1"/>
  </entry>
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