Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

## Summary In affected versions of `openclaw`, the sandbox fs-bridge `writeFile` commit step used an unanchored container path during the final move into place. An attacker racing parent-path changes inside the sandbox could redirect the committed file outside the validated sandbox path.

## Impact This is a sandbox boundary bypass. In-sandbox code could win a time-of-check-time-of-use race and cause host-approved `writeFile` operations to land outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.

## Affected Packages and Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `< 2026.3.11` - Fixed in: `2026.3.11`

## Technical Details The hardening work for anchored remove, rename, and mkdir operations did not fully cover the `writeFile` commit path. The final `mv` still used the raw target path, leaving a race window between safety revalidation and the in-container commit step.

## Fix OpenClaw now anchors the `writeFile` commit path to the canonical parent directory before the final move. The fix shipped in `openclaw@2026.3.11`.

## Workarounds Upgrade to `2026.3.11` or later.

Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw before 2026.3.11 contains a sandbox boundary bypass vulnerability in the fs-bridge writeFile commit step that uses an unanchored container path during the final move operation. An attacker can exploit a time-of-check-time-of-use race condition by modifying parent paths inside the sandbox to redirect committed files outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.