Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

### Summary

Versions of the `openclaw` npm package prior to `2026.2.2` could be coerced into fetching arbitrary `http(s)` URLs during attachment/media hydration. An attacker who can influence the media URL (for example via model-controlled `sendAttachment` or auto-reply media URLs) could trigger SSRF to internal resources and exfiltrate the fetched bytes as an outbound attachment.

### Plain-English Explanation

OpenClaw can send files by downloading them first.

On vulnerable versions (`< 2026.2.2`), if an attacker could get OpenClaw to treat a URL as the “file to attach”, OpenClaw would download that URL from the gateway machine and then send the downloaded bytes back out as an attachment.

That matters because the gateway can often reach internal-only endpoints that an attacker cannot (for example `127.0.0.1` services, private RFC1918 addresses, or cloud metadata endpoints). This is a data-leak risk.

This does not directly grant code execution or shell access; it is about making the gateway perform HTTP requests and returning the response bytes.

### Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `< 2026.2.2` - Fixed: `>= 2026.2.2`

Release timeline (npm):

- `2026.2.1` published `2026-02-02T11:45:27Z` - `2026.2.2` published `2026-02-04T00:56:41Z` - This advisory was created `2026-02-05T10:42:26Z`

### Details

In affected versions, remote media fetching performed a raw `fetch(url)` without SSRF protections.

Starting in `2026.2.2`, remote media f…

Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in attachment and media URL hydration that allows remote attackers to fetch arbitrary HTTP(S) URLs. Attackers who can influence media URLs through model-controlled sendAttachment or auto-reply mechanisms can trigger SSRF to internal resources and exfiltrate fetched response bytes as outbound attachments.