Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

OpenClaw's macOS Dashboard flow exposed Gateway authentication material to browser-controlled surfaces.

Before the fix, the macOS app appended the shared Gateway `token` and `password` to the Dashboard URL query string when opening the Control UI in the browser. The Control UI then imported the token and persisted it into browser `localStorage` under `openclaw.control.settings.v1`.

This expanded exposure of reusable Gateway admin credentials into browser address-bar/query surfaces and persistent script-readable storage.

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published version verified vulnerable: `2026.3.2` - Affected range: `<= 2026.3.2` - Patched version: `>= 2026.3.7`

## Impact

An attacker with access to browser-controlled surfaces or persistent browser storage could recover a valid Gateway admin token and reuse it against the OpenClaw management interface.

The exposure chain was:

1. macOS `Open Dashboard` constructed a URL with auth material. 2. The browser received that credential-bearing URL. 3. The Control UI imported the token from the URL. 4. The Control UI persisted the token in `localStorage`.

## Fix

The fix aligns the macOS Dashboard flow with the safer existing CLI/bootstrap pattern and removes persistent browser token storage:

- macOS Dashboard now passes the Gateway token via URL fragment instead of query parameters. - macOS Dashboard no longer propagates the shared Gateway password into browser URLs. - Control UI keeps…