Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

### Summary

OpenClaw's plugin installation path derivation could be abused by a malicious plugin `package.json` `name` to escape the intended extensions directory and write files to a parent directory.

### Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `>= 2026.1.20, < 2026.2.1` - Fixed: `>= 2026.2.1` - Latest published as of 2026-02-14: `2026.2.13` (not affected)

### Details

In affected versions, the plugin installer derives the on-disk install directory from the plugin manifest name without robust validation.

Example (POSIX / macOS / Linux):

- Manifest name: `@malicious/..` - `unscopedPackageName("@malicious/..")` yields `..` - The install directory becomes `path.join(extensionsDir, "..")`, which resolves to the parent of the extensions directory.

This can cause plugin files to be written into the OpenClaw state directory (default `~/.openclaw/`) rather than a subdirectory of `~/.openclaw/extensions/`.

Note: on Windows, affected versions also failed to sanitize backslashes (`\\`) in the derived directory name, which can enable deeper traversal via crafted `pluginId` strings.

### Impact

This issue requires a user/operator to install untrusted plugin content (for example via `openclaw plugins install`). In many deployments, plugin installation is an operator-only action and may be performed on a separate machine; that operational separation significantly reduces exposure for the primary gateway/runtime host.

On hosts where untrusted plugins…

Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions 2026.1.29-beta.1 prior to 2026.2.1 contain a path traversal vulnerability in plugin installation that allows malicious plugin package names to escape the extensions directory. Attackers can craft scoped package names containing path traversal sequences like .. to write files outside the intended installation directory when victims run the plugins install command.