Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

### Summary

On Windows nodes, exec requests were executed via `cmd.exe /d /s /c <rawCommand>`. In allowlist/approval-gated mode, the allowlist analysis did not model Windows `cmd.exe` parsing and metacharacter behavior. A crafted command string could cause `cmd.exe` to interpret additional operations (for example command chaining via `&`, or expansion via `%...%` / `!...!`) beyond what was allowlisted/approved.

### Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `<= 2026.2.1` - Patched: `>= 2026.2.2` - Latest (npm) as of 2026-02-14: `2026.2.13`

### Details

- Default installs: Not affected unless you opt into exec allowlist/approval gating on Windows nodes. - Windows execution uses `cmd.exe` via `src/infra/node-shell.ts`. - The fix hardens Windows allowlist enforcement by: - Passing the platform into allowlist analysis and rejecting Windows shell metacharacters. - Treating `cmd.exe` invocation as not allowlist-safe on Windows. - Avoiding `cmd.exe` entirely in allowlist mode by executing the parsed argv directly when possible.

### Fix Commit(s)

- `a7f4a53ce80c98ba1452eb90802d447fca9bf3d6`

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 fail to properly validate Windows cmd.exe metacharacters in allowlist-gated exec requests (non-default configuration), allowing attackers to bypass command approval restrictions. Remote attackers can craft command strings with shell metacharacters like & or %...% to execute unapproved commands beyond the allowlisted operations.