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  <updated>2026-09-30T03:58:43.519056+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-28473</id>
    <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-28473 — OpenClaw authorization bypass: operator.write can resolve exec approvals via chat.send -&gt; /approve</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T03:58:43.520666+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>### What this means (plain language)</p>
<p>If you give a client “chat/write” access to the gateway (`operator.write`) but you do not intend to let that client approve exec requests (`operator.approvals`), affected versions could still let that client approve/deny a pending exec approval by sending the `/approve` chat command.</p>
<p>This is mainly relevant for shared or multi-client setups where different tokens are intentionally scoped differently. Single-operator installs are typically less impacted.</p>
<p>### Technical summary</p>
<p>A gateway client authenticated with a device token scoped only to `operator.write` (without `operator.approvals`) could approve/deny pending exec approval requests by sending a chat message containing the built-in `/approve` command.</p>
<p>`exec.approval.resolve` is correctly scoped to `operator.approvals` for direct RPC calls, but the `/approve` command path invoked it via an internal privileged gateway client.</p>
<p>## Affected Packages / Versions</p>
<p>- `openclaw` (npm): `&lt; 2026.2.2`</p>
<p>## Fix</p>
<p>- Fixed in `openclaw` `2026.2.2`.
- Fix commit(s): `efe2a464afcff55bb5a95b959e6bd9ec0fef086e`.
- Change: when `/approve` is invoked from gateway clients (webchat/internal channel), it now requires the requesting client to have `operator.approvals` (or `operator.admin`).</p>
<p>## Workarounds</p>
<p>- Upgrade to `openclaw &gt;= 2026.2.2`.
- If you cannot upgrade: avoid issuing write-only device tokens to untrusted clients; disable text commands (`commands.text=false`) or restrict access to…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-28473"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-28473</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-28473 — OpenClaw &lt; 2026.2.2 - Authorization Bypass via /approve Chat Command</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T03:58:43.520795+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p>
<p>OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability where clients with operator.write scope can approve or deny exec approval requests by sending the /approve chat command. The /approve command path invokes exec.approval.resolve through an internal privileged gateway client, bypassing the operator.approvals permission check that protects direct RPC calls.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-28473"/>
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