Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

### Summary In `openclaw` up to and including **2026.2.23** (latest npm release as of **February 24, 2026**), sandbox bind-source validation could be bypassed when a bind source used a symlinked parent plus a non-existent leaf path.

### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `<= 2026.2.23` - Patched: `>= 2026.2.24` (planned next release)

### Root Cause `validateBindMounts` previously relied on full-path realpath only when the full source path already existed. For missing-leaf paths, parent symlink traversal was not fully canonicalized before allowed-root and blocked-path checks.

### Security Impact A source path that looked inside an allowed root could resolve outside that root (including blocked runtime paths) once the missing leaf was created, weakening sandbox bind-source boundary enforcement.

### Fix The validation path now canonicalizes through the nearest existing ancestor, then always re-checks the canonical path against both: - allowed source roots - blocked runtime paths

### Verification - `pnpm check` - `pnpm exec vitest run --config vitest.gateway.config.ts` - `pnpm test:fast` - Added regression tests for symlink-parent + missing-leaf bypass patterns.

### Fix Commit(s) - `b5787e4abba0dcc6baf09051099f6773c1679ec1`

### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.24`) so after npm publish the advisory can be published without further field edits.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.…

Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.24 contain a sandbox bind validation vulnerability allowing attackers to bypass allowed-root and blocked-path checks via symlinked parent directories with non-existent leaf paths. Attackers can craft bind source paths that appear within allowed roots but resolve outside sandbox boundaries once missing leaf components are created, weakening bind-source isolation enforcement.