Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

### Summary

A remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the gateway-to-node invocation path allowed an authenticated gateway client to bypass node-host exec approvals by injecting internal control fields into `node.invoke` parameters.

### Affected Component

- Gateway method: `node.invoke` for node command `system.run` - Node host runner: exec approval gating for `system.run`

### Impact

If an attacker can authenticate to a gateway (for example via a leaked/shared gateway token or a paired device token with `operator.write`), they could execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts that support `system.run`. This can lead to full compromise of developer workstations, CI runners, and servers running the node host.

### Technical Details

The gateway forwarded user-controlled `params` to node hosts without sanitizing internal approval fields. The node host treated `params.approved === true` and/or `params.approvalDecision` as sufficient to skip the approval workflow.

### Fix

Patched in **OpenClaw `2026.2.14`**.

- Commits: - `318379cdb8d045da0009b0051bd0e712e5c65e2d` - `a7af646fdab124a7536998db6bd6ad567d2b06b0` - `c1594627421f95b6bc4ad7c606657dc75b5ad0ce` - `0af76f5f0e93540efbdf054895216c398692afcd` - Gateway strips untrusted approval control fields from `system.run` user input. - Gateway only re-attaches approval flags when `params.runId` references a valid `exec.approval.request` record and the request context matches. Approval IDs are bound to the reque…

Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a vulnerability in the gateway in which it fails to sanitize internal approval fields in node.invoke parameters, allowing authenticated clients to bypass exec approval gating for system.run commands. Attackers with valid gateway credentials can inject approval control fields to execute arbitrary commands on connected node hosts, potentially compromising developer workstations and CI runners.