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  <updated>2026-10-06T18:31:55.341905+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-56839</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-56839 — PraisonAI Code agent tools fail open without a workspace boundary</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T18:31:55.343216+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p>
<p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.59, the CODE_TOOLS wrappers keep _workspace_root as None and pass workspace=None to read_file, search_replace, and apply_diff helpers that enforce path containment only for a truthy workspace. An application that exposes code_read_file, code_search_replace, or code_apply_diff before set_workspace can therefore let prompt-influenced calls read and modify files outside the intended project directory, while explicitly configured workspaces remain effective. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.59.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-56839"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3512</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-3512 — PraisonAI Code agent tools fail open without a workspace boundary</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T18:31:55.343285+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai</p>
<p># PraisonAI Code agent tools fail open without a workspace boundary</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>PraisonAI Code's agent-compatible `CODE_TOOLS` wrappers keep a global workspace root initialized to `None`. If an application uses `CODE_TOOLS`, `code_read_file`, `code_search_replace`, or `code_apply_diff` before calling `set_workspace()`, the wrappers pass `workspace=None` into lower-level helpers that only enforce path containment when a workspace is truthy. Absolute paths outside the intended project workspace are then read and modified.</p>
<p>The official examples correctly call `set_workspace()` before `CODE_TOOLS`, and this report does not claim configured workspaces are ineffective. The issue is the fail-open default. PraisonAI's security documentation describes workspace boundaries as the path-traversal protection mechanism, and the already-published Python API arbitrary file write advisory (`GHSA-hvhp-v2gc-268q`) was fixed by defaulting an unset workspace to `os.getcwd()`. The adjacent read and edit paths reached through `CODE_TOOLS` still fail open.</p>
<p>## Affected Components</p>
<p>- Package: `praisonai`
- Current upstream main tested: `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`
- Latest tested release: `v4.6.57`
- Primary files:
  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/code/agent_tools.py`
  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/read_file.py`
  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/search_replace.py`
  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/apply_diff.py`</p>
<p>## Root Cause</p>
<p>`agent_tools.py` initializes `_workspac…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3512"/>
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