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  <updated>2026-10-17T21:06:32.740098+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61435</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-61435 — PraisonAI before 4.6.78 Authentication Bypass via Host Header Spoofing</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T21:06:32.747846+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI</p>
<p>PraisonAI before 4.6.78 contains an authentication bypass in the Call API agent invocation endpoints (src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py) when PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled is configured. The safeguard intended to restrict the disabled-auth opt-out to localhost binding derives the bind host from request.url.hostname, which is taken from the client-controlled HTTP Host header. A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can reach the service over the network can send a spoofed 'Host: 127.0.0.1' header to bypass the localhost-only restriction and list (GET /api/v1/agents) and invoke (POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke) registered agents without authentication.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61435"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4247</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-4247 — PraisonAI: Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T21:06:32.747915+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai</p>
<p># Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>PraisonAI's patched `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` safeguard for the n8n/call agent invocation API can be bypassed with a spoofed `Host: 127.0.0.1` header, allowing an unauthenticated network caller to list and invoke registered agents when the service is reachable and the opt-out is enabled.</p>
<p>## Technical Details</p>
<p>The affected code is `src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py`. `verify_token()` is used as a FastAPI dependency for the `/api/v1/agents` routes, including `POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke`. Current code no longer unconditionally skips authentication when `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled`; it tries to allow that opt-out only for localhost binding:</p>
<p>```python
_LOCALHOST_HOSTS = frozenset({'127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '::1'})</p>
<p>def _bind_host_from_request(request: Request) -&gt; str:
    host = getattr(getattr(request, 'url', None), 'hostname', None)
    return host or os.getenv('PRAISONAI_CALL_BIND_HOST', '127.0.0.1')</p>
<p>async def verify_token(request: Request, authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)) -&gt; None:
    if _call_auth_disabled():
        bind_host = _bind_host_from_request(request)
        if bind_host not in _LOCALHOST_HOSTS:
            raise HTTPException(
                status_code=503,
                detail="PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled is only permitted for localhost binding",
            )
        return
```</p>
<p>The violated invariant is that "localhost binding" m…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4247"/>
  </entry>
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