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  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-20T21:05:09.815343+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99454</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99454</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T21:05:09.818593+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path</p>
<p>The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a
malicious AP in two ways:</p>
<p>1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to
hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer.  All of
rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute</p>
<p>length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len;</p>
<p>and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes</p>
<p>datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8;</p>
<p>for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len).
A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows
these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in
aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le()
length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from
the rx skb.  Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;
this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the
unconditional iv[3] access within the frame.</p>
<p>2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through
the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking
whether decryptor() returned NULL.  On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast
protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path
always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a
use-after-fr…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99454"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8gvv-m75j-pq7x</id>
    <title>GHSA-8gvv-m75j-pq7x</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T21:05:09.818705+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path</p>
<p>The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a
malicious AP in two ways:</p>
<p>1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to
hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer.  All of
rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute</p>
<p>length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len;</p>
<p>and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes</p>
<p>datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8;</p>
<p>for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len).
A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows
these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in
aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le()
length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from
the rx skb.  Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;
this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the
unconditional iv[3] access within the frame.</p>
<p>2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through
the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking
whether decryptor() returned NULL.  On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast
protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path
always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a
use-after-fr…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8gvv-m75j-pq7x"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99454</id>
    <title>msrc_CVE-2026-99454 — staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T21:05:09.818749+00:00</updated>
    <content>msrc_CVE-2026-99454</content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99454"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</id>
    <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T21:05:09.818773+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695"/>
  </entry>
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