In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gpio: exar: initialize the ID before registering its cleanup

devm_add_action_or_reset() invokes the cleanup action immediately when registering the action fails. gpio_exar_probe() currently stores the allocated ID in exar_gpio only after registering the action, so that failure makes exar_devm_ida_free() release ID 0. If the allocated ID is nonzero, this leaks that ID and can free ID 0 belonging to another device.

Store the ID before registering the cleanup action so both the immediate failure path and normal device teardown release the correct allocation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

gpio: exar: initialize the ID before registering its cleanup

devm_add_action_or_reset() invokes the cleanup action immediately when registering the action fails. gpio_exar_probe() currently stores the allocated ID in exar_gpio only after registering the action, so that failure makes exar_devm_ida_free() release ID 0. If the allocated ID is nonzero, this leaks that ID and can free ID 0 belonging to another device.

Store the ID before registering the cleanup action so both the immediate failure path and normal device teardown release the correct allocation.