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  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-24T12:48:05.402171+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98919</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-98919</title>
    <updated>2026-10-24T12:48:05.434428+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>drm/xe: harden adjust_idledly() against divide-by-zero and overflow</p>
<p>adjust_idledly() has several corner-case issues flagged during review:</p>
<p>1. If xe_gt_clock_init() failed to recognise the crystal clock,
     gt-&gt;info.timestamp_base is 0, which makes idledly_units_ps also 0.
     The subsequent DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(..., idledly_units_ps) is then a
     divide-by-zero and panics the kernel.</p>
<p>2. The tick-to-ns conversions are done in u32:
        idledly * idledly_units_ps, (maxcnt - 1) * 1000
     Both overflow u32 before DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() sees them.</p>
<p>3. If IDLE_WAIT_TIME reads back as 0, maxcnt evaluates to 0 and
     the maxcnt - 1 clamp wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF in u32.</p>
<p>4. The register only stores whole ticks, so the clamped ns value has
     to be converted to ticks and back. DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() can round
     that conversion up past maxcnt:</p>
<p>maxcnt = 640 ns, one tick = 666664 ps</p>
<p>clamp:        maxcnt - 1        = 639 ns
       ns -&gt; ticks:  639000 / 666664   = 0.958 -&gt; rounds to 1 tick
       tick -&gt; ns:    1 * 666664 / 1000 = 667 ns</p>
<p>667 ns is programmed into RING_IDLEDLY, but 667 &gt;= maxcnt (640),
     so xe_gt_WARN_ON() fires again on every subsequent init.</p>
<p>Return early if timestamp_base is 0 (the unknown-crystal path).
Do the conversions in u64 via the *_ULL() helpers so they cannot wrap.
Clamp with a floor (DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL) so the programmed delay stays
strictly below maxcn…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98919"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wghv-7vwx-fc47</id>
    <title>GHSA-wghv-7vwx-fc47</title>
    <updated>2026-10-24T12:48:05.434617+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>drm/xe: harden adjust_idledly() against divide-by-zero and overflow</p>
<p>adjust_idledly() has several corner-case issues flagged during review:</p>
<p>1. If xe_gt_clock_init() failed to recognise the crystal clock,
     gt-&gt;info.timestamp_base is 0, which makes idledly_units_ps also 0.
     The subsequent DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(..., idledly_units_ps) is then a
     divide-by-zero and panics the kernel.</p>
<p>2. The tick-to-ns conversions are done in u32:
        idledly * idledly_units_ps, (maxcnt - 1) * 1000
     Both overflow u32 before DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() sees them.</p>
<p>3. If IDLE_WAIT_TIME reads back as 0, maxcnt evaluates to 0 and
     the maxcnt - 1 clamp wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF in u32.</p>
<p>4. The register only stores whole ticks, so the clamped ns value has
     to be converted to ticks and back. DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() can round
     that conversion up past maxcnt:</p>
<p>maxcnt = 640 ns, one tick = 666664 ps</p>
<p>clamp:        maxcnt - 1        = 639 ns
       ns -&gt; ticks:  639000 / 666664   = 0.958 -&gt; rounds to 1 tick
       tick -&gt; ns:    1 * 666664 / 1000 = 667 ns</p>
<p>667 ns is programmed into RING_IDLEDLY, but 667 &gt;= maxcnt (640),
     so xe_gt_WARN_ON() fires again on every subsequent init.</p>
<p>Return early if timestamp_base is 0 (the unknown-crystal path).
Do the conversions in u64 via the *_ULL() helpers so they cannot wrap.
Clamp with a floor (DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL) so the programmed delay stays
strictly below maxcn…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wghv-7vwx-fc47"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98919</id>
    <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98919 — drm/xe: harden adjust_idledly() against divide-by-zero and overflow</title>
    <updated>2026-10-24T12:48:05.434684+00:00</updated>
    <content>msrc_CVE-2026-98919</content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98919"/>
  </entry>
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