In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xen/netfront: drop RX packets with a short Ethernet header

handle_incoming_queue() pulls pull_to bytes into the head before calling eth_type_trans(). pull_to is the length of the first RX slot, capped at RX_COPY_THRESHOLD, and that length comes from the backend. Nothing checks it against ETH_HLEN.

If the first slot is shorter than ETH_HLEN and more slots follow, the head ends up shorter than an Ethernet header while skb->len is longer, and eth_type_trans() BUG()s in __skb_pull(). If the whole packet is shorter than ETH_HLEN, eth_type_trans() reads the header past the end of the data instead.

Pull at least ETH_HLEN, and drop the packet if that fails, which also drops packets too short to hold an Ethernet header. This also checks the return value of the pull, which was ignored.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xen/netfront: drop RX packets with a short Ethernet header

handle_incoming_queue() pulls pull_to bytes into the head before calling eth_type_trans(). pull_to is the length of the first RX slot, capped at RX_COPY_THRESHOLD, and that length comes from the backend. Nothing checks it against ETH_HLEN.

If the first slot is shorter than ETH_HLEN and more slots follow, the head ends up shorter than an Ethernet header while skb->len is longer, and eth_type_trans() BUG()s in __skb_pull(). If the whole packet is shorter than ETH_HLEN, eth_type_trans() reads the header past the end of the data instead.

Pull at least ETH_HLEN, and drop the packet if that fails, which also drops packets too short to hold an Ethernet header. This also checks the return value of the pull, which was ignored.