The parser in PEAK-System PCAN driver correctly detected the malformed record, but the loop iterating the record list advanced its processed-bytes counter even when a record had been rejected as invalid. The PEAK-System PCAN diagnostic call did not validate that the caller-supplied output buffer was large enough to hold the output record. The copied source field in PEAK-System PCAN is attacker-influenced through the related file-device write path, and the caller can combine a small output allocation with controlled source bytes. The PEAK-System PCAN parser indexes a length table using attacker-controlled DLC without enforcing DLC <= 0x0f, then copies attacker payload from record+0x1c into a fixed-size stack destination. The PEAK-System PCAN type 0x4030 processing path fails to validate a selected/returned object pointer before dereferencing fixed fields during post-processing. PEAK-System PCAN contains a vulnerable operation involving a variable-length receive-record copy. The driver uses a requested or queued record count without sufficiently capping the copy to the actual caller-supplied output length.