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  <updated>2026-11-09T21:43:45.667444+00:00</updated>
  <author>
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    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-87045</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-87045</title>
    <updated>2026-11-09T21:43:45.670359+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The HTTP/2 server in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_http2.c clears the connection's stream binding at the start of every frame. handle_http_frame_header() executed client-&gt;current_stream = NULL unconditionally, but a CONTINUATION frame does not open a new stream and enter_http_frame_continuation_state() never re-bound one, so the rest of the header block was processed with client-&gt;current_stream unset. Two paths then write through the NULL pointer. A request for an unregistered resource, or a method the matched resource does not support, is answered by send_http2_404() or send_http2_405(), and both call send_headers_frame(), which unconditionally sets client-&gt;current_stream-&gt;headers_sent = true. A POST, PUT or PATCH to a registered dynamic resource reaches handle_http2_dynamic_resource(), which unlike its siblings (handle_http2_static_resource(), dynamic_get_del_opts_req_v2(), dynamic_post_put_req_v2()) had no client-&gt;current_stream == NULL guard, and stores through the pointer with client-&gt;current_stream-&gt;current_detail = dynamic_detail.</p>
<p>Any peer that can reach the server can trigger this without authentication or prior state. A single stray CONTINUATION frame with END_HEADERS set, sent right after the client preface and requesting any unregistered path, is enough, because nothing rejected a CONTINUATION that no HEADERS frame had opened. A legitimate split header block (a HEADERS frame with END_HEADERS clear whose payload ends on a header-field boundary, then a CONTINUATI…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-87045"/>
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