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  <updated>2026-09-28T18:45:06.172121+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-83805</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-83805</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T18:45:06.183490+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.1.8, the generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint does not enforce approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, or the one-response-per-user restriction applied by the intended approve and deny actions. A user with only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can submit approved responses directly, while writable user and state fields permit responses to be attributed to arbitrary users. These forged responses can satisfy min_approvers, approve the workflow, and activate its gated ScheduledJob without a legitimate approver. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.8.</p>
      </div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-83805"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q4c5-2j6f-r476</id>
    <title>GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476 — Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of schedu…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T18:45:06.183568+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: nautobot</p>
<p>### Impact
This is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.</p>
<p>1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, `change` permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the `approve`/`deny` actions on `ApprovalWorkflowStage`. The generic `ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse` create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` can `POST` approved responses directly and drive a stage past its `min_approvers` threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes `user` and `state` as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.</p>
<p>2. Escalated impact  job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a `ScheduledJob`, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through `ApprovalWorkflow.save()` to `on_workflow_approved()`, which sets the target job to enabled/active.</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>Fixed in Nautobot v3.1.8</p>
<p>### Workarounds
Restrict the `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage `approve`/`deny` actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q4c5-2j6f-r476"/>
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