https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-01T23:26:24.826351+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@gcve.eu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73302 fkie_cve-2026-73302 2026-10-01T23:26:24.859336+00:00

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.30, the OIDC flow in packages/backend-core/src/middleware/passport/sso/oidc.ts resolved an email without getEmailVerified or an email_verified requirement, and packages/backend-core/src/middleware/passport/sso/sso.ts then used users.getGlobalUserByEmail as a fallback account-linking key. An attacker who can authenticate through a configured identity provider that asserts a victim email as unverified can have a fresh provider identity merged into the victim Budibase account and inherit the victim roles. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.30.

 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f GHSA-hp6v-6jw7-gv2f — Budibase: OIDC SSO account takeover: incoming identity linked by email without checking email_verified 2026-10-01T23:26:24.859442+00:00

Affected: npm: @budibase/server

### Summary Budibase's OIDC SSO login links an incoming SSO identity to an existing Budibase account **by email address alone**, without ever checking the `email_verified` claim of the OIDC ID token. Budibase first tries to match the IdP `sub`; when that misses (any fresh attacker IdP account) it silently falls back to matching by the `email` claim and **merges into the existing account by email**, preserving that account's `_id` and roles. Because the `email_verified` flag is never read, an attacker who can make a **configured/trusted** IdP emit a token carrying `email = <victim>` with `email_verified = false` is logged into Budibase **as the victim**, inheriting the victim's roles (including global admin/builder). Per OIDC Core §5.7 the `email` claim MUST NOT be used as an identity key unless `email_verified` is `true`; Budibase effectively delegates all account-linking trust to every configured IdP's email-verification policy while checking nothing itself. Full account takeover of any existing Budibase user, including the instance owner.

### Details The OIDC verify callback extracts the email and never consults `email_verified`: - `packages/backend-core/src/middleware/passport/sso/oidc.ts:59` — `email: getEmail(profile, jwtClaims)`. - `getEmail` (`oidc.ts:113-135`) returns `profile._json.email` ->`jwtClaims.email` -> `preferred_username`. **No `email_verified` check.** - `buildJwtClaims` (`oidc.ts:99-107`) assembles claims from `_json.email`/`emails[0].value` — no verifi…