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  <updated>2026-11-20T06:40:21.356207+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71861</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-71861</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T06:40:21.357809+00:00</updated>
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        <p>The Chainguard SDK is a public Go SDK for integrating with the Chainguard platform. Prior to 0.1.107, auth/aws.VerifyToken trusts the Chainguard-Audience and Chainguard-Identity headers without requiring those headers to be covered by AWS SigV4 SignedHeaders. An attacker with a fresh STS GetCallerIdentity request signed by a victim can rewrite the unsigned binding headers and replay the proof to another relying party, causing the relying party to authenticate the victim’s AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. Code that only uses auth/aws.GenerateToken is unaffected because the generator signs the binding headers, and exploitation requires a signed request within its validity window. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.107.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-71861"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wq26-3j2m-4hvv</id>
    <title>GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv — Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding header…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T06:40:21.357892+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: chainguard.dev/sdk</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The `auth/aws` package of the `chainguard.dev/sdk` Go library provides Chainguard's AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request). Its verifier, `VerifyToken`, reads the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in `SignedHeaders` and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a `GetCallerIdentity` request that a victim signed for a *different* relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers *after* signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with `VerifyToken`. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay.</p>
<p>### Background</p>
<p>The package uses the standard "signed `GetCallerIdentity`" pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method and Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator` use: the caller signs an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves:</p>
<p>- `GenerateToken` (client): builds the `GetCallerIdentity` request, adds the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumab…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wq26-3j2m-4hvv"/>
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