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  <updated>2026-09-29T01:46:58.451368+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67178</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-67178</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T01:46:58.489016+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>MISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an incorrectly formatted HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect:</p>
<p>Redirect permanent / https://misp.example</p>
<p>Apache’s Redirect directive appends any portion of the requested path that follows the matched prefix to the configured destination URL. Because the destination did not end with /, attacker-controlled path content was appended directly to the hostname rather than to its URL path.</p>
<p>For example, a request resembling:</p>
<p>http://misp.example/@attacker.example/</p>
<p>could result in a redirect resembling:</p>
<p>https://misp.example@attacker.example/</p>
<p>Under standard URL parsing, misp.example is interpreted as user information and attacker.example as the destination host. An unauthenticated remote attacker could therefore construct a URL hosted under the legitimate MISP domain that redirects users to an attacker-controlled website.</p>
<p>The vulnerability could be used for phishing, credential collection, or potentially disclosing sensitive query-string information preserved during the redirect. Exploitation requires a user to follow the crafted HTTP URL.</p>
<p>The fix adds the missing trailing slash to the redirect destination, ensuring that appended request data remains part of the path on the configured MISP host.</p>
<p>Existing installationsExisting MISP installations should review their Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration and ensure that the HTTPS redirect destination ends with a trailing slash:</p>
<p>Redirect permanent / ht…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-67178"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20146</id>
    <title>gcve-1-2026-20146 — Open Redirect in MISP Installer-Generated Apache Configuration</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T01:46:58.489174+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> misp</p>
<p>MISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an incorrectly formatted HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect:</p>
<p>Redirect permanent / https://misp.example</p>
<p>Apache’s Redirect directive appends any portion of the requested path that follows the matched prefix to the configured destination URL. Because the destination did not end with /, attacker-controlled path content was appended directly to the hostname rather than to its URL path.</p>
<p>For example, a request resembling:</p>
<p>http://misp.example/@attacker.example/</p>
<p>could result in a redirect resembling:</p>
<p>https://misp.example@attacker.example/</p>
<p>Under standard URL parsing, misp.example is interpreted as user information and attacker.example as the destination host. An unauthenticated remote attacker could therefore construct a URL hosted under the legitimate MISP domain that redirects users to an attacker-controlled website.</p>
<p>The vulnerability could be used for phishing, credential collection, or potentially disclosing sensitive query-string information preserved during the redirect. Exploitation requires a user to follow the crafted HTTP URL.</p>
<p>The fix adds the missing trailing slash to the redirect destination, ensuring that appended request data remains part of the path on the configured MISP host.</p>
<p>Existing installationsExisting MISP installations should review their Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration and ensure that the HTTPS redirect destination ends with a trailing slash:</p>
<p>Redirect permanent / ht…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20146"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-frjf-677q-65jf</id>
    <title>GHSA-frjf-677q-65jf</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T01:46:58.489261+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>MISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an incorrectly formatted HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect:</p>
<p>Redirect permanent / https://misp.example</p>
<p>Apache’s Redirect directive appends any portion of the requested path that follows the matched prefix to the configured destination URL. Because the destination did not end with /, attacker-controlled path content was appended directly to the hostname rather than to its URL path.</p>
<p>For example, a request resembling:</p>
<p>http://misp.example/@attacker.example/</p>
<p>could result in a redirect resembling:</p>
<p>https://misp.example@attacker.example/</p>
<p>Under standard URL parsing, misp.example is interpreted as user information and attacker.example as the destination host. An unauthenticated remote attacker could therefore construct a URL hosted under the legitimate MISP domain that redirects users to an attacker-controlled website.</p>
<p>The vulnerability could be used for phishing, credential collection, or potentially disclosing sensitive query-string information preserved during the redirect. Exploitation requires a user to follow the crafted HTTP URL.</p>
<p>The fix adds the missing trailing slash to the redirect destination, ensuring that appended request data remains part of the path on the configured MISP host.</p>
<p>Existing installationsExisting MISP installations should review their Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration and ensure that the HTTPS redirect destination ends with a trailing slash:</p>
<p>Redirect permanent / ht…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-frjf-677q-65jf"/>
  </entry>
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