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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-11T01:16:31.534823+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57080</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-57080</title>
    <updated>2026-11-11T01:16:31.536949+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.1.0 for Perl allow remote memory exhaustion via an uncapped peer-wire message-length prefix.</p>
<p>The peer-wire framing in _process_messages trusts the 4-byte length prefix sent by a connected peer with no upper bound, while receive_data appends every inbound byte to the input buffer. A peer announces a length prefix of up to about 4 GiB and then streams bytes; the decoder waits until the buffer holds the full message before processing it, so the buffer grows without limit.</p>
<p>Peer connections are unauthenticated, so any peer in the swarm exhausts the downloading process's memory. The largest legitimate message is a 16 KiB piece block, so any announced length far above that is anomalous.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57080"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-h9mr-rh28-v9r2</id>
    <title>GHSA-h9mr-rh28-v9r2</title>
    <updated>2026-11-11T01:16:31.537061+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl allow remote memory exhaustion via an uncapped peer-wire message-length prefix.</p>
<p>The peer-wire framing in _process_messages trusts the 4-byte length prefix sent by a connected peer with no upper bound, while receive_data appends every inbound byte to the input buffer. A peer announces a length prefix of up to about 4 GiB and then streams bytes; the decoder waits until the buffer holds the full message before processing it, so the buffer grows without limit.</p>
<p>Peer connections are unauthenticated, so any peer in the swarm exhausts the downloading process's memory. The largest legitimate message is a 16 KiB piece block, so any announced length far above that is anomalous.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-h9mr-rh28-v9r2"/>
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