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  <updated>2026-10-04T15:20:18.123186+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55832</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-55832</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T15:20:18.150872+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Tract is a tiny, no-nonsense, self-contained TensorFlow and ONNX inference toolkit. Prior to 0.21.17, 0.22.3, and 0.23.2, the tract-onnx crate passes the attacker-controlled external_data location from an ONNX model through onnx/src/tensor.rs get_external_resources and joins the value to the model directory without rejecting absolute paths or parent directory components. Loading an untrusted model through model_for_path can therefore make onnx/src/data_resolver.rs MmapDataResolver open an arbitrary local file and place the file contents into model tensors or inference output. Attacker-controlled offset and length fields can also select an out-of-range mapping slice and cause a denial of service, but the flaw does not write files or execute code. This issue is fixed in versions 0.21.17, 0.22.3, and 0.23.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55832"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-h668-6x6g-f8r5</id>
    <title>GHSA-h668-6x6g-f8r5 — tract: Arbitrary file read via unsanitized ONNX external_data `location` (path traversal) on model load in tract-onnx</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T15:20:18.150992+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: tract-onnx</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>`tract` (the `tract-onnx` crate) resolves an ONNX tensor's external-data `location` by joining it onto the model directory **without any sanitization**. Because `location` comes from the (untrusted) `.onnx` file, a malicious model can make `tract` open and read an **arbitrary local file** at load time, with the file's contents flowing into the model's tensors / inference output (read-only file disclosure). This is the ONNX external-data path-traversal class that the reference `onnx` library hardened over several CVEs; `tract` resolves `location` itself and was never hardened.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>In `onnx/src/tensor.rs`, `get_external_resources()` builds the path with no checks:</p>
<p>```rust
let location = /* tensor.external_data "location" value — attacker-controlled */;
let p = PathBuf::from(path).join(location);          // no is_absolute / ".." / canonicalize / containment check
provider.read_bytes_from_path(&amp;mut tensor_data, &amp;p, offset, length)?;   // Mmap::map(File::open(p)) by default
```</p>
<p>- `Path::join` with an **absolute** `location` (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) discards the base directory → `p = /etc/passwd`.
- A **relative** `../../../../etc/passwd` value is not normalized → directory traversal.
- The default `MmapDataResolver` (`onnx/src/data_resolver.rs`) then `mmap`s the file and copies `mmap[offset..offset+length]` into the tensor. `offset`/`length` are also taken from the file; an out-of-range slice **panics** (DoS).</p>
<p>No `is_absolute`, `..`, `canonicalize`, or cont…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-h668-6x6g-f8r5"/>
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