https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-11-05T17:33:40.893697+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@gcve.eu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55098 fkie_cve-2026-55098 2026-11-05T17:33:40.895853+00:00

Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to the repository-verified 26.06.2 repair, the remediation of `CVE-2026-47735` leaves a cross-database authorization bypass through DuckDB table-valued I/O functions. In `internal/database/sandbox.go`, `allowed_directories` uses `cfg.LocalStorageRoot`, configured by `storage.local_path`, while `enable_external_access=false` blocks access outside that entire multi-tenant root. `GetStoragePath` in `internal/storage/util.go` stores all databases beneath it. In `internal/api/query.go`, `extractTableReferences` skips names followed by an opening parenthesis and `checkQueryPermissions` allows queries with no extracted table references, including tokens with `permissions: []`. The `userSQLReadParquetPattern` denylist catches literal `read_parquet(` and the earlier protection also blocks `arc_partition_agg(`, but misses the `parquet_scan` alias and `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_blob`, `read_csv_auto`, `read_json` and `read_text`. A request to `POST /api/v1/query` using these unblocked functions passes `ValidateSQLRequest` and `convertSQLToStoragePaths` without tenant authorization, allowing reads and enumeration of other databases' time-series data, schema and per-column value-range statistics within the allowlisted root. The sandbox still blocks out-of-root OS files and HTTP SSRF, and the sibling SQLite token database outside the root is not exposed by this mechanism. The earlier 26.06.1 reme…

 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-93cm-2v4m-c56c GHSA-93cm-2v4m-c56c — Arc: DuckDB I/O aliases bypass database RBAC after CVE-2026-47735 2026-11-05T17:33:40.895958+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/basekick-labs/arc

### Summary

The fix for CVE-2026-47735 (released 2026.06.1) is incomplete. It added a DuckDB sandbox (`SET GLOBAL allowed_directories=[<storage root>]; SET GLOBAL enable_external_access=false`) and an Arc SQL-layer denylist of the **literal** functions `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(`. The sandbox correctly blocks reads **outside** the storage root (OS files, `http://` SSRF), but it allowlists the **entire multi-tenant storage root**, and the SQL denylist still misses the rest of the DuckDB I/O family the original advisory enumerated. As a result, any authenticated token — including one with `permissions: []` — can read or enumerate **every other database's data** within the deployment, defeating RBAC.

Verified at HEAD `c08b892` (`v26.06.1-36`, includes 26.06.2). Confirmed still live; no later commit blocks these functions.

### Root cause (three composing gaps)

1. **Sandbox scope is the whole storage root, not the tenant.** `internal/database/sandbox.go:111` allowlists `cfg.LocalStorageRoot` (default `storage.local_path=./data/arc`). Every database lives under it — `internal/storage/util.go:33` `GetStoragePath` => `<base>/<database>/<measurement>/**/*.parquet`. Any in-root path is sandbox-permitted regardless of which database owns it. 2. **RBAC never inspects table-valued functions.** `checkQueryPermissions` (`internal/api/query.go:1181`) extracts table refs via `extractTableReferences`, which skips any name followed by `(` as a function (`internal/api/query.go:…