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  <updated>2026-10-01T02:33:44.750058+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55072</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-55072</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T02:33:44.773452+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Pimcore is an Open Source Data &amp; Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2026.1.5, an authenticated user with the objects permission can submit a malicious ClassDefinition UID because the name and ID validation expressions in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php validate only the beginning of each value. When a data object of that class containing a Block field is loaded, Block::load in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Block.php incorporates the stored class ID into an unquoted object table identifier, allowing the UID to supply SQL syntax. The resulting query can read or modify arbitrary Pimcore database tables, including disclosure of password hashes, and the flaw represents an incomplete validation hardening because earlier work added a start anchor without enforcing the end of the identifier. This issue is fixed in version 2026.1.5.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55072"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-2mhj-fhvg-v428</id>
    <title>GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428 — Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T02:33:44.773539+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: pimcore/pimcore</p>
<p>### Summary
A missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.</p>
<p>### Details
### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation</p>
<p>`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:</p>
<p>```php
if (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\w+/', $this-&gt;getName())) {
    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this-&gt;getName()));
}</p>
<p>if (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?/', $this-&gt;getId())) {
    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this-&gt;getId(), $this-&gt;getName()));
}
```</p>
<p>Both patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex matches `1` at the start and ignores the rest.</p>
<p>Compare with the correct pattern used by Fieldcollection in `models/DataObject/Fieldcollection/Definition.php` line 268:</p>
<p>```php
if (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\w*$/', $key)) {   // has $ — correct
    return true;
}
```</p>
<p>### 3. Unquoted classId concatenation…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-2mhj-fhvg-v428"/>
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