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  <updated>2026-09-30T01:49:12.999316+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54736</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-54736</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T01:49:13.021406+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Phalcon is a high-performance, full-stack PHP framework. Prior to 5.14.1, Phalcon\Encryption\Crypt::decrypt compares the attacker-supplied HMAC tag against the freshly computed HMAC using PHP/Zephir identity comparison, which lowers to a byte-wise comparison that returns early on the first differing byte. This observable timing discrepancy can allow an attacker to recover a valid tag byte-by-byte and attach it to a chosen IV and ciphertext so that decrypt() accepts tampered encrypted content as authentic. This issue is fixed in version 5.14.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54736"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8jqh-95g6-7jpj</id>
    <title>GHSA-8jqh-95g6-7jpj — Phalcon: Non-constant-time HMAC verification in `Encryption\Crypt::decrypt` (timing side-channel)</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T01:49:13.021483+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: phalcon/cphalcon</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`Phalcon\Encryption\Crypt` provides authenticated encryption: when `useSigning` is enabled (the default), `encrypt()` appends an HMAC tag and `decrypt()` verifies it before returning the plaintext. The verification compares the attacker-supplied tag against the freshly computed HMAC using PHP/Zephir identity comparison (`!==`), which the Zephir compiler lowers to `!ZEPHIR_IS_IDENTICAL(...)` — a byte-wise `memcmp` that returns early on the first differing byte. The comparison time therefore depends on how many leading bytes of the supplied tag are correct, a classic MAC-verification timing side-channel. Every other secret/MAC comparison in the framework uses the constant-time `hash_equals()` (`zephir_hash_equals`) — the CSRF token check (`Security::checkToken`) and the JWT signature check (`Signer\Hmac::verify`); `Crypt::decrypt` is the lone deviation.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>### Vulnerable code</p>
<p>`phalcon/Encryption/Crypt.zep:246` (Zephir source):</p>
<p>```zephir
if true === this-&gt;useSigning {
    // Checks on the decrypted message digest using the HMAC method.
    if digest !== hash_hmac(hashAlgorithm, padded, decryptKey, true) {
        throw new Mismatch("Hash does not match.");
    }
}
```</p>
<p>Generated C --&gt; `ext/phalcon/encryption/crypt.zep.c:364-367`:</p>
<p>```c
ZEPHIR_CALL_FUNCTION(&amp;_8$$7, "hash_hmac", NULL, 245, &amp;hashAlgorithm, &amp;padded, &amp;decryptKey, &amp;__$true);
...
if (!ZEPHIR_IS_IDENTICAL(&amp;digest, &amp;_8$$7)) {                 // &lt;-- non-constant-time
    ZEPHIR_THROW_EXCEPTION_DEB…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8jqh-95g6-7jpj"/>
  </entry>
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