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  <updated>2026-10-01T12:30:51.230614+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54511</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-54511</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T12:30:51.258627+00:00</updated>
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        <p>LogTape is an unobtrusive logging library. Prior to 1.3.11, 2.0.14, and 2.1.5, the @logtape/syslog package's escapeStructuredDataValue() function in packages/syslog/src/syslog.ts does not neutralize C0 control characters from U+0000 through U+001F in structured data values, and formatStructuredData() inserts property keys without validating the RFC 5424 SD-NAME grammar. When includeStructuredData is true, an attacker-controlled newline can terminate an RFC 6587 non-transparent TCP syslog frame and make following bytes appear as a forged RFC 5424 record, while a key containing a closing bracket or other forbidden character can terminate or corrupt the structured-data element. Applications that forward attacker-controlled property values or keys can therefore allow forged records with arbitrary hosts, applications, process identifiers, facilities, or severity levels, undermining downstream collector and SIEM integrity. This issue is fixed in versions 1.3.11, 2.0.14, and 2.1.5.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54511"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8h6h-x5pq-56fq</id>
    <title>GHSA-8h6h-x5pq-56fq — @logtape/syslog: syslog log injection via unescaped control characters and unvalidated SD-NAME keys</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T12:30:51.258747+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @logtape/syslog</p>
<p>`@logtape/syslog` contains two related output-encoding bugs in the structured data formatting code. Both only affect deployments with `includeStructuredData: true`, which is non-default.</p>
<p>## 1. Unescaped C0 control characters in structured data values</p>
<p>`escapeStructuredDataValue()` in `packages/syslog/src/syslog.ts` escapes `\`, `"`, and `]` per RFC 5424 but does not escape newline (`\n`), carriage return (`\r`), or any other C0 control characters (U+0000–U+001F):</p>
<p>```typescript
function escapeStructuredDataValue(value: string): string {
  return value
    .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\")
    .replace(/"/g, '\\"')
    .replace(/]/g, "\\]");
  // \n, \r, and other C0 control characters are not escaped
}
```</p>
<p>TCP syslog commonly uses `\n` as a frame delimiter (RFC 6587, non-transparent framing). If an attacker-controlled value contains a literal newline, that newline terminates the current syslog frame. Bytes following the newline begin a new frame, and if they form a valid RFC 5424 header (`&lt;PRI&gt;1 …`), a downstream collector will accept them as a separate, authentic-looking syslog record.</p>
<p>## 2. Unvalidated SD-NAME keys</p>
<p>Structured data parameter keys are inserted into the message without validation or escaping:</p>
<p>```typescript
elements.push(`${key}="${escapedValue}"`);
```</p>
<p>RFC 5424 defines SD-NAME as printable US-ASCII characters excluding `=`, `]`, `"`, and space, with a maximum length of 32. A key containing any of those characters, control characters, or exceeding the length limit…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8h6h-x5pq-56fq"/>
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