<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-13T04:52:13.088935+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://db.gcve.eu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54097</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-54097</title>
    <updated>2026-11-13T04:52:13.091031+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.63.6, a low-privileged authenticated user of filebrowser (with create + delete permissions in their own isolated scope) can silently destroy share-link records belonging to any other user — including the administrator — by performing a legitimate DELETE on a file in their own directory whose logical path happens to be a byte-prefix of another user's stored share.Link.Path. The file contents of the victim are not exposed, but the victim's share links are irrevocably wiped. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.63.6.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54097"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5ww9-jg6q-38r7</id>
    <title>GHSA-5ww9-jg6q-38r7 — File Browser: Cross-user unauthorized share-link deletion via unbounded prefix match in DeleteWithPathPrefix</title>
    <updated>2026-11-13T04:52:13.091138+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser, Go: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2</p>
<p>### Summary
A low-privileged authenticated user of filebrowser (with `create` + `delete` permissions in their own isolated scope) can silently destroy share-link records belonging to any other user — including the administrator — by performing a legitimate DELETE on a file in their own directory whose logical path happens to be a byte-prefix of another user's stored `share.Link.Path`. The file contents of the victim are not exposed, but the victim's share links are irrevocably wiped.</p>
<p>### Details
`resourceDeleteHandler` in `http/resource.go` cleans up any share records that reference a deleted file by calling:</p>
<p>```go
// http/resource.go
err = d.store.Share.DeleteWithPathPrefix(file.Path)
```</p>
<p>`file.Path` here is the *logical* path from the URL of the deleting user's request (e.g. `/a`), not the absolute filesystem path. It is passed as-is to the bolt backend:</p>
<p>```go
// storage/bolt/share.go
func (s shareBackend) DeleteWithPathPrefix(pathPrefix string) error {
    var links []share.Link
    if err := s.db.Prefix("Path", pathPrefix, &amp;links); err != nil {
        return err
    }
    for _, link := range links {
        err = errors.Join(err, s.db.DeleteStruct(&amp;share.Link{Hash: link.Hash}))
    }
    return err
}
```
**Why the design contradicts this behavior.** `share.Link` carries a `UserID` field and the application elsewhere treats shares as per-user owned resources. `shareDeleteHandler` explicitly enforces `link.UserID != d.user.ID &amp;&amp; !d.user.Perm.Admin → 403`. The file-de…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5ww9-jg6q-38r7"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
