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  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-02T14:01:45.848392+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47425</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-47425</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T14:01:45.892198+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Rattler is a library that provides common functionality used within the conda ecosystem. Prior to version 0.43.2, `EntryPoint::FromStr` in `rattler_conda_types` performs only `.trim()` on the `command` field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious `noarch:python` package can ship an `info/link.json` with an entry-point name containing `..`, `/`, `\`, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as `bin/pip`) with mode `0o775` on Unix and a copied launcher `.exe` on Windows. This affects the default install path of `pixi install`, `mamba install` via py-rattler, `rattler-build`, and any other consumer of the `rattler` install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved. Version 0.43.2 contains a fix for the issue.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47425"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q53q-5r4j-5729</id>
    <title>GHSA-q53q-5r4j-5729 — rattler has an entry-point path traversal in noarch:python install (arbitrary file write)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T14:01:45.892397+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: rattler, PyPI: py-rattler</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`EntryPoint::FromStr` in `rattler_conda_types` performs only `.trim()` on the `command` field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious `noarch:python` package can ship an `info/link.json` with an entry-point name containing `..`, `/`, `\`, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as `bin/pip`) with mode `0o775` on Unix and a copied launcher `.exe` on Windows. This affects the default install path of `pixi install`, `rattler-build`, some methods in `py-rattler`, and any other consumer of the `rattler` install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.</p>
<p>Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.</p>
<p>## Affected</p>
<p>- Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
- Commit: `a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3` (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
- Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: `prefix-dev/pixi` @ `e640477`
- pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue</p>
<p>## Researcher</p>
<p>Berkant Koc &lt;me@berkoc.com&gt;
PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q53q-5r4j-5729"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-2971</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2971 — rattler has an entry-point path traversal in noarch:python install (arbitrary file write)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T14:01:45.892474+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: py-rattler</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`EntryPoint::FromStr` in `rattler_conda_types` performs only `.trim()` on the `command` field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious `noarch:python` package can ship an `info/link.json` with an entry-point name containing `..`, `/`, `\`, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as `bin/pip`) with mode `0o775` on Unix and a copied launcher `.exe` on Windows. This affects the default install path of `pixi install`, `rattler-build`, some methods in `py-rattler`, and any other consumer of the `rattler` install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved.</p>
<p>Resolved in https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2445, released in rattler 0.43.2.</p>
<p>## Affected</p>
<p>- Repository: https://github.com/conda/rattler
- Commit: `a0e61a33da8b9d6de712fab2a879fa9da977e6e3` (HEAD at audit time, 2026-05-13 release)
- Downstream consumers reached through the same code path: `prefix-dev/pixi` @ `e640477`
- pixi 0.69.0 and rattler-build 0.65.0 fix this issue</p>
<p>## Researcher</p>
<p>Berkant Koc &lt;me@berkoc.com&gt;
PGP: 0C588DFD76204987284213EA0AC529C41F8AA5D6</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-2971"/>
  </entry>
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