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  <updated>2026-09-30T21:32:32.857650+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46700</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-46700</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T21:32:32.876083+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to 26.6.0, the GET /secret/:name endpoint in @actual-app/sync-server checks only that the caller has a valid session and does not verify the caller is an admin, while the sibling POST /secret/ handler enforces an admin check in OpenID mode. Any authenticated non-admin BASIC user in OpenID multi-user deployments can probe the secrets store and learn which admin-managed bank-sync integrations have been configured, including simplefin_accessKey, pluggyai_clientSecret, pluggyai_itemIds, and the gocardless secrets. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-46700"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3f62-qv96-4p78</id>
    <title>GHSA-3f62-qv96-4p78 — @actual-app/sync-server's missing authorization on GET /secret/:name allows non-admin OpenID users to enumerate admin-c…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T21:32:32.876271+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @actual-app/sync-server</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>In `@actual-app/sync-server`, the `GET /secret/:name` endpoint (`app-secrets.js:53`) checks only that the caller has a valid session — it does not verify the caller is an admin. The sibling `POST /secret/` handler does enforce an admin check in OpenID mode, exposing an authorization asymmetry. Any authenticated non-admin (BASIC) user in OpenID multi-user deployments can probe the secrets store and learn which admin-managed bank-sync integrations have been configured (existence, not values). This includes integration credentials that are not otherwise observable to non-admins, such as `simplefin_accessKey`, `pluggyai_clientSecret`, `pluggyai_itemIds`, and the `gocardless_*` secrets.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>`packages/sync-server/src/app-secrets.js` mounts `validateSessionMiddleware` at the router level (line 15), so all handlers inherit only "must be authenticated." The POST handler then explicitly upgrades to an admin check when the active auth method is `openid`:</p>
<p>```js
// app-secrets.js:17-46
app.post('/', async (req, res) =&gt; {
  // ... look up active auth method ...
  if (method === 'openid') {
    const canSaveSecrets = isAdmin(res.locals.user_id);
    if (!canSaveSecrets) {
      res.status(403).send({
        status: 'error',
        reason: 'not-admin',
        details: 'You have to be admin to set secrets',
      });
      return;
    }
  }
  secretsService.set(name, value);
  // ...
});
```</p>
<p>The sibling GET handler skips both the method check and the admin check ent…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3f62-qv96-4p78"/>
  </entry>
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