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  <updated>2026-10-03T09:49:07.981632+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45310</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-45310</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T09:49:08.000253+00:00</updated>
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        <p>CodeWhale is a DeepSeek + MiMo coding agent in terminal. Prior to 0.8.22, the fetch_url tool validates the initial URL's resolved IP address against a restricted-IP blocklist (is_restricted_ip()) to prevent SSRF attacks against internal services (cloud metadata endpoints, localhost, private networks). However, the HTTP client (reqwest) is configured to automatically follow up to 5 redirects (reqwest::redirect::Policy::limited(5)) without re-validating the redirect target against the same SSRF protections. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.8.22.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45310"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-96ff-gc8g-wpvg</id>
    <title>GHSA-96ff-gc8g-wpvg — DeepSeek TUI has SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in fetch_url Tool</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T09:49:08.000320+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: deepseek-tui, crates.io: deepseek-tui-cli, npm: deepseek-tui</p>
<p>### Summary
The `fetch_url` tool validates the initial URL's resolved IP address against a restricted-IP blocklist (`is_restricted_ip()`) to prevent SSRF attacks against internal services (cloud metadata endpoints, localhost, private networks). However, the HTTP client (`reqwest`) is configured to automatically follow up to 5 redirects (`reqwest::redirect::Policy::limited(5)`) without re-validating the redirect target against the same SSRF protections.</p>
<p>### PoC
**Step 1 — Baseline:** Confirm `fetch_url` blocks direct requests to restricted IPs.
```
Prompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
Expected: Error — "restricted address (private/loopback/link-local)"
```</p>
<p>**Step 2 — SSRF bypass via redirect:** Fetch a public URL that redirects to the restricted IP.</p>
<p>```
Prompt: use fetch_url to fetch http://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&amp;status_code=302
```</p>
<p>**Expected result:** The error message says "connection refused" or "request failed: connect error" — NOT "restricted address." This proves the SSRF filter was bypassed; the connection failed only because `169.254.169.254` is unreachable from a non-cloud machine.</p>
<p>**Observed result:** `fetch_url` followed the 302 redirect and attempted to connect to `169.254.169.254`. The error was a TCP-level connection failure, confirming the application-layer SSRF check was not applied to the redirect target.</p>
<p>**Step 3 — Redirect to attacker-controlled host:** Confirm attacker-…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-96ff-gc8g-wpvg"/>
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