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  <updated>2026-10-03T11:51:40.913566+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-29794</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-29794</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T11:51:40.932941+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.8 and prior to version 2.2.0, unauthenticated users are able to bypass the application's built-in rate-limits by spoofing the `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers due to the rate-limit relying on the value of `(echo.Context).RealIP`. Unauthenticated users can abuse endpoints available to them for different potential impacts. The immediate concern would be brute-forcing usernames or specific accounts' passwords. This bypass allows unlimited requests against unauthenticated endpoints. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-29794"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m547-hp4w-j6jx</id>
    <title>GHSA-m547-hp4w-j6jx — Vikunja has a Rate-Limit Bypass for Unauthenticated Users via Spoofed Headers</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T11:51:40.933026+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: code.vikunja.io/api</p>
<p>### Summary
Unauthenticated users are able to bypass the application's built-in rate-limits by spoofing the `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers due to the rate-limit relying on the value of `(echo.Context).RealIP`.</p>
<p>### Details
In the first file below, the rate-limit for unauthenticated users can be observed being populated with the `ip` value. In the second file, it shows it using the `c.RealIP()` function for the `ip` case. Due to this, the rate-limit will rely on the value of one of the two mentioned headers (`X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP`). These can be spoofed by users client-side in order to completely bypass any unauthenticated rate-limits in place.</p>
<p>Some reverse proxies like Traefik will overwrite this value by default, but others will not, leaving any deployment that either isn't using a reserve proxy that specifically overwrites the header's value or isn't using a reverse proxy vulnerable.</p>
<p>**File 1:** pkg\routes\routes.go:318
```go
// This is the group with no auth
	// It is its own group to be able to rate limit this based on different heuristics
	n := a.Group("")
	setupRateLimit(n, "ip")</p>
<p>// Docs
	n.GET("/docs.json", apiv1.DocsJSON)
	n.GET("/docs", apiv1.RedocUI)</p>
<p>// Prometheus endpoint
	setupMetrics(n)</p>
<p>// Separate route for unauthenticated routes to enable rate limits for it
	ur := a.Group("")
	rate := limiter.Rate{
		Period: 60 * time.Second,
		Limit:  config.RateLimitNoAuthRoutesLimit.GetInt64(),
	}
	rateLimiter := createRateLimiter(rate)
	ur.Use…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m547-hp4w-j6jx"/>
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