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  <updated>2026-11-14T12:57:53.451956+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123818</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-123818</title>
    <updated>2026-11-14T12:57:53.453919+00:00</updated>
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        <p>LMDeploy is a toolkit for compressing, deploying, and serving large language models. From 0.12.3 until 0.15.0, _is_safe_url validates remote media URLs with urlparse while requests.Session().get interprets backslashes differently when sending the request. An attacker can provide a URL whose validation hostname appears globally routable but whose request destination resolves to an internal host, bypassing non-global address checks. Applications that accept attacker-controlled remote media URLs can therefore be induced to access internal HTTP services and expose data available from those services. This issue is fixed in version 0.15.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123818"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-39wr-7q6h-cf68</id>
    <title>GHSA-39wr-7q6h-cf68 — LMDeploy has an SSRF bypass</title>
    <updated>2026-11-14T12:57:53.454285+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: lmdeploy</p>
<p>### Summary
The URL checking logic in lmdeploy has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.</p>
<p>### Details
The current lmdeploy project uses `_is_safe_url` to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.
&lt;img width="943" height="836" alt="QQ20260416-203956-16-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/042faad1-7458-444a-bbc9-525c772b0a4d" /&gt;
However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using `_is_safe_url` for URL validation, and then using requests.Session().get to send the request.
&lt;img width="1086" height="576" alt="QQ20260416-204053-16-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7ffb8a69-b155-483a-90be-016c53e6387a" /&gt;
The core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to:</p>
<p>- `urlparse()` treats `\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public)
- `requests` treats `\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)</p>
<p>Below is a test code I wrote following the code.
```
from urllib.parse import urlparse
import ipaddress
import socket
import requests</p>
<p>def _is_safe_url(url: str) -&gt; tuple[bool, str]:
    """Check if the URL is safe to fetch (not inte…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-39wr-7q6h-cf68"/>
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