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  <updated>2026-11-11T16:04:33.107657+00:00</updated>
  <author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123369</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-123369</title>
    <updated>2026-11-11T16:04:33.127110+00:00</updated>
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        <p>compose-lint is a Docker Compose security linter that identifies dangerous misconfigurations before deployment. Prior to 0.31.0, compose-lint prints attacker-controlled service names, environment keys, file lines, and other Compose text without neutralizing GitHub Actions and Azure Pipelines workflow-command openers. When a workflow processes a pull request, legacy ##[ commands or a line-leading double-colon command can create false annotations, hide log regions, mask selected strings, or invoke other commands recognized by the runner. The affected text report paths do not alter the compose-lint exit code or pass or fail result, but they can misrepresent the CI output presented to reviewers. This issue is fixed in version 0.31.0.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123369"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6</id>
    <title>GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6 — compose-lint: Compose file text can issue GitHub Actions workflow commands through the compose-lint Action</title>
    <updated>2026-11-11T16:04:33.127243+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> GitHub Actions: tmatens/compose-lint, PyPI: compose-lint</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>The GitHub Actions runner treats certain text in a step's output as commands. The legacy form, `##[command]`, is recognized anywhere in a line. compose-lint's text report prints service names, environment keys and lines of the Compose file, and it does not neutralize `##[`. Inside the compose-lint Action, a Compose file from a pull request can therefore:</p>
<p>- create fake error or warning annotations on the pull request (`##[error]`, `##[warning]`)
- fold the rest of the log, including the real verdict, out of sight (`##[group]`)
- blank out chosen strings for the rest of the log (`##[add-mask]`)</p>
<p>GitHub has postponed removing the deprecated `set-output` log command, so the runner still honors it. A test run of the Action on a GitHub-hosted runner confirmed that a `::set-output` line from a Compose file is processed. Whether it can override the Action's own `sarif-written` output, which decides whether the SARIF upload step runs, has not been tested.</p>
<p>The exit code and the pass/fail result are not affected. Azure Pipelines parses the same `##[` syntax, so the pip package is listed for anyone printing the text report in other CI systems.</p>
<p>Found during an internal pre-1.0 security review.</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>Fixed in 0.31.0. The Action stops the runner from processing workflow commands while compose-lint's output is printed, using a random `stop-commands` token. The text report also escapes `##[`, and `::` at the start of a line, in anything taken from the Compose file.</p>
<p>##…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6"/>
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