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  <updated>2026-11-09T04:14:46.538581+00:00</updated>
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    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
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    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-119213</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-119213</title>
    <updated>2026-11-09T04:14:46.539917+00:00</updated>
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        <p>The Fluent Support – Helpdesk &amp; Customer Support Ticket System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated modification of a linked customer's stored profile fields in versions up to, and including, 2.4.7 Its first-party Fluent Forms integration (FeedIntegration::notify()) opens a ticket from each public form submission and, for a logged-out submitter, resolves the submitted email to an existing WordPress account via get_user_by('email', ...) without verifying the submitter controls that address, then passes the attacker-supplied data to Customer::maybeCreateCustomer(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite a limited set of a registered customer's stored profile fields where an administrator has enabled a FluentSupport feed on a public form. The email address, role and status are never changed; first and last name are overwritten only when the target user has no name set in user meta; and other fields (title, address, city, state, zip, country) are writable only where an administrator has mapped them in the feed.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-119213"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q7x6-x924-p7cg</id>
    <title>GHSA-q7x6-x924-p7cg</title>
    <updated>2026-11-09T04:14:46.540001+00:00</updated>
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        <p>The Fluent Support – Helpdesk &amp; Customer Support Ticket System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated modification of a linked customer's stored profile fields in versions up to, and including, 2.4.7 Its first-party Fluent Forms integration (FeedIntegration::notify()) opens a ticket from each public form submission and, for a logged-out submitter, resolves the submitted email to an existing WordPress account via get_user_by('email', ...) without verifying the submitter controls that address, then passes the attacker-supplied data to Customer::maybeCreateCustomer(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite a limited set of a registered customer's stored profile fields where an administrator has enabled a FluentSupport feed on a public form. The email address, role and status are never changed; first and last name are overwritten only when the target user has no name set in user meta; and other fields (title, address, city, state, zip, country) are writable only where an administrator has mapped them in the feed.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q7x6-x924-p7cg"/>
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