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  <updated>2026-11-06T20:11:57.268898+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118250</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-118250</title>
    <updated>2026-11-06T20:11:57.270949+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Highcharts JS is a JavaScript charting library based on SVG. From 6.1.0 until 11.4.9, 12.6.1, and 3.1.0, Highcharts follows dot-separated series.keys paths without filtering each segment. An attacker who controls series.keys and matching point data can use a path through __proto__ to assign arbitrary named properties to Object.prototype. Those properties are visible to all JavaScript in the page, and no user interaction is required beyond rendering the chart. This issue is fixed in 11.4.9, 12.6.1, and 3.1.0.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118250"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rmqc-xvr3-v46c</id>
    <title>GHSA-rmqc-xvr3-v46c — Highcharts: dotted series.keys paths write to Object.prototype</title>
    <updated>2026-11-06T20:11:57.271044+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: highcharts</p>
<p>### Impact
A dot-separated key path taken from `series.keys` is followed without filtering the individual segments. An attacker who controls `series.keys` and the matching point data can use a path such as `__proto__.polluted` to set arbitrary properties on `Object.prototype`. The resulting properties are visible to all JavaScript running in the page, not only to the chart. No user interaction is required beyond rendering the chart.</p>
<p>The injected properties are inert until other code on the page reads them, so consequences depend on the consuming application.</p>
<p>### Workarounds
Drop-in fix - for any versions affected (6.1.0-13.0.2). Add the below IIFE to run after Highcharts is loaded.</p>
<p>```javascript
((H)=&gt;{const X = H.isObject;H.Point.prototype.setNestedProperty = function setNestedProperty(t,e,i){let s=i.split(".");return s.some(t=&gt;"__proto__"===t||"constructor"===t)||s.reduce(function(t,i,s,o){let r=o.length-1===s;return t[i]=r?e:X(t[i],!0)?t[i]:{},t[i]},t),t};})(Highcharts);
```</p>
<p>[Live demo &amp; testing](https://jsfiddle.net/BlackLabel/z3rbtm7u/)</p>
<p>### Obtaining the patched version
The patched releases are available from all the usual distribution channels. With npm, upgrade the affected package to the patched version listed above, for example `npm install highcharts@13.1.1`. If you load Highcharts from the CDN, use the versioned URLs on code.highcharts.com, for example `https://code.highcharts.com/13.1.1/highcharts.js`. For more on each installation method, see the [installat…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rmqc-xvr3-v46c"/>
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