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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-30T06:05:28.483438+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1415</id>
    <title>certfr-2026-avi-1415 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans Apache Kafka. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un attaquant de…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-30T06:05:28.519649+00:00</updated>
    <content>certfr-2026-avi-1415</content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1415"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-6rr8-5qq5-gq73</id>
    <title>GHSA-6rr8-5qq5-gq73</title>
    <updated>2026-10-30T06:05:28.519719+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>When a broker decodes a compressed record batch, the per-record decoder reads a declared body size from the decompressed stream and allocates a buffer of that size before validating it against the bytes available or any configured limit. The size is attacker-controlled, and the batch CRC does not constrain it, so a small (around 90-byte), CRC-valid compressed produce request can declare a body size of up to about 2 GiB and force the broker to attempt that allocation, raising OutOfMemoryError. The record size limit (max.message.bytes), the request size limit, and client/broker quotas bound only the compressed wire size, not the declared decompressed size.</p>
<p>Impact:</p>
<p>An authenticated principal with Write on a topic can crash broker request-handler threads (reached when a batch's codec differs from the topic's compression.type and records are re-encoded) and any consumer that fetches the record, denying service. On brokers started with -XX:+ExitOnOutOfMemoryError, a common hardening, a single crafted request terminates the broker JVM. More seriously, a crafted record  is accepted at ingest and written to disk; when the log-cleaner later reads it on a compacted topic, the OutOfMemoryError (an Error, not an Exception) terminates the cleaner thread, which is not restarted. With the default of a single cleaner thread, log compaction then stops for the entire broker, including the internal __consumer_offsets and __transaction_state topics, and the condition persists across restarts…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-6rr8-5qq5-gq73"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-114349</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-114349</title>
    <updated>2026-10-30T06:05:28.519802+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: kafka</p>
<p>When a broker decodes a compressed record batch, the per-record decoder reads a declared body size from the decompressed stream and allocates a buffer of that size before validating it against the bytes available or any configured limit. The size is attacker-controlled, and the batch CRC does not constrain it, so a small (around 90-byte), CRC-valid compressed produce request can declare a body size of up to about 2 GiB and force the broker to attempt that allocation, raising OutOfMemoryError. The record size limit (max.message.bytes), the request size limit, and client/broker quotas bound only the compressed wire size, not the declared decompressed size. Impact: An authenticated principal with Write on a topic can crash broker request-handler threads (reached when a batch's codec differs from the topic's compression.type and records are re-encoded) and any consumer that fetches the record, denying service. On brokers started with -XX:+ExitOnOutOfMemoryError, a common hardening, a single crafted request terminates the broker JVM. More seriously, a crafted record  is accepted at ingest and written to disk; when the log-cleaner later reads it on a compacted topic, the OutOfMemoryError (an Error, not an Exception) terminates the cleaner thread, which is not restarted. With the default of a single cleaner thread, log compaction then stops for the entire broker, including the internal __consumer_offsets and __transaction_state topics, and the condition persists across restarts unt…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-114349"/>
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