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  <updated>2026-10-15T20:46:38.294796+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107381</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-107381</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T20:46:38.311212+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>svg-sanitizer is a PHP SVG/XML sanitizer. Prior to 1.0.0, Resolver::processReferences() in src/ElementReference/Resolver.php builds the SVG &lt;use&gt; reference graph with a case-sensitive href attribute predicate before cleanHrefAttributes() normalizes mixed-case names. An attacker can provide xlink:HrEf on nested &lt;use&gt; elements so the graph omits those references, after which the sanitizer converts the attribute to canonical xlink:href and returns the live nesting structure without applying the useNestingLimit protection. A consuming application that renders the sanitized SVG can therefore be exposed to the resource exhaustion that control is designed to prevent. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107381"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m9xh-6747-9r6f</id>
    <title>GHSA-m9xh-6747-9r6f — svg-sanitizer: Mixed-case xlink:HrEf skips the `&lt;use&gt;` nesting-DoS check in Resolver::processReferences</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T20:46:38.311291+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: enshrined/svg-sanitize</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`Resolver::processReferences()` collects `&lt;use&gt;` elements with the XPath predicate `use[@href or @xlink:href]`, which is case sensitive. A `&lt;use&gt;` element written as `xlink:HrEf` is therefore never added to the reference graph, so the nesting-DoS nullification never marks it for removal. `Sanitizer::cleanHrefAttributes()` then runs later in the same pass and rewrites `xlink:HrEf` back to the canonical `xlink:href`. The sanitizer hands back a fully live nesting bomb that it would have stripped completely had the input used canonical casing.</p>
<p>This is the mirror image of CVE-2025-55166: that fix made href *value* checking case insensitive, but the `&lt;use&gt;` reference graph still selects nodes case sensitively.</p>
<p>## Where it is</p>
<p>`src/ElementReference/Resolver.php:97-118`, the case-sensitive node selection:</p>
<p>```php
$useNodeName = $this-&gt;xPath-&gt;createNodeName('use');
foreach ($this-&gt;subjects as $subject) {
    $useElements = $this-&gt;xPath-&gt;query(
        $useNodeName . '[@href or @xlink:href]',
        $subject-&gt;getElement()
    );
```</p>
<p>`src/Sanitizer.php:479-504`, the normalization that happens afterwards and makes the attribute live again:</p>
<p>```php
// in case the attribute name is `HrEf`/`xlink:HrEf`, adjust it to `href`/`xlink:href`
if (!in_array($attribute-&gt;nodeName, $this-&gt;allowedAttrs, true)
    &amp;&amp; in_array(strtolower($attribute-&gt;nodeName), $this-&gt;allowedAttrs, true)
) {
    $element-&gt;removeAttribute($attribute-&gt;nodeName);
    $element-&gt;setAttribute(strtolower($attrib…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m9xh-6747-9r6f"/>
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