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  <updated>2026-10-17T12:31:12.490933+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107226</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-107226</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T12:31:12.501289+00:00</updated>
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        <p>The AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library allows Java applications to easily execute HTTP requests and asynchronously process HTTP responses. From 2.1.0 until 3.0.14, the default ThreadSafeCookieStore does not retain whether a Set-Cookie response used a secure transport. It accepts Secure cookies received over plaintext and permits insecure cookies to overlay or delete existing Secure cookies with matching scope. An attacker controlling a plaintext same-site response can consequently plant, replace, or remove cookie state later sent to an HTTPS origin, enabling session fixation, CSRF-token replacement, or loss of security-relevant state. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.14.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107226"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-p2jm-6hj6-9rjg</id>
    <title>GHSA-p2jm-6hj6-9rjg — AsyncHttpClient: Cookies received over plaintext HTTP can plant, overwrite or delete Secure cookies set over HTTPS</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T12:31:12.501351+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client</p>
<p>### Impact
The cookie store ignores the scheme a `Set-Cookie` arrived on. draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-22 (approved to obsolete RFC 6265, in the RFC Editor queue) Section 5.7 requires a user agent to ignore a cookie with the `Secure` attribute unless it arrived over a secure connection (step 13), and to ignore a non-Secure cookie from an insecure connection when it would overlay a Secure cookie the store already holds (step 16). Neither rule is implemented. The only `Secure` handling is on retrieval, where a Secure cookie is not sent over plaintext.</p>
<p>So anyone who can answer a plaintext request to a site can set, replace or delete the site's `Secure` cookies, and the next HTTPS request carries the attacker's value back inside TLS:</p>
<p>```
http://example.com   -&gt;  Set-Cookie: SID=attacker-value; Secure; Path=/
https://example.com  -&gt;  Cookie: SID=attacker-value
```</p>
<p>This does not need an attacker on the network path. A plaintext host under the same site reaches the HTTPS one by setting a domain cookie:</p>
<p>```
http://insecure.example.com  -&gt;  Set-Cookie: SID=attacker-value; Secure; Domain=example.com; Path=/
https://bank.example.com     -&gt;  Cookie: SID=attacker-value
```</p>
<p>A plaintext `Set-Cookie` of the same name, domain and path overwrites a Secure cookie, and one with `Max-Age=0` deletes it. Depending on what the application does with the cookie, this is session fixation into the HTTPS session, an overwritten CSRF token, or the removal of a cookie the site relies on. Unlike GHSA…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-p2jm-6hj6-9rjg"/>
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