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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-13T11:17:18.811464+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-54590</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2025-54590</title>
    <updated>2026-10-13T11:17:18.829561+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>webfinger.js is a TypeScript-based WebFinger client that runs in both browsers and Node.js environments. In versions 2.8.0 and below, the lookup function accepts user addresses for account checking. However, the ActivityPub specification requires preventing access to localhost services in production. This library does not prevent localhost access, only checking for hosts that start with "localhost" and end with a port. Users can exploit this by creating servers that send GET requests with controlled host, path, and port parameters to query services on the instance's host or local network, enabling blind SSRF attacks. This is fixed in version 2.8.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-54590"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8xq3-w9fx-74rv</id>
    <title>GHSA-8xq3-w9fx-74rv — webfinger.js Blind SSRF Vulnerability</title>
    <updated>2026-10-13T11:17:18.829629+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: webfinger.js</p>
<p>### Description
The lookup function takes a user address for checking accounts as a feature, however, as per
the ActivityPub spec (https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#security-considerations), on the
security considerations section at B.3, access to Localhost services should be prevented while
running in production. The library does not prevent Localhost access (neither does it prevent
LAN addresses such as 192.168.x.x) , thus is not safe for use in production by ActivityPub
applications. The only check for localhost is done for selecting between HTTP and HTTPS
protocols, and it is done by testing for a host that starts with the string “localhost” and ends with
a port. Anything else (such as “127.0.0.1” or “localhost:1234/abc”) would not be considered
localhost for this test.</p>
<p>In addition, the way that the function determines the host, makes it possible to access any path
in the host, not only “/.well-known/...” paths:</p>
<p>```javascript
if (address.indexOf('://') &gt; -1) {
  // other uri format
  host = address.replace(/ /g,'').split('/')[2];
} else {
  // useraddress
  host = address.replace(/ /g,'').split('@')[1];
}</p>
<p>var uri_index = 0; // track which URIS we've tried already
var protocol = 'https'; // we use https by default</p>
<p>if (self.__isLocalhost(host)) {
  protocol = 'http';
}</p>
<p>function __buildURL() {
  var uri = '';
  if (! address.split('://')[1]) {
  // the URI has not been defined, default to acct
    uri = 'acct:';
  }
  return protocol + '://' + host + '/.well-known/' +…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8xq3-w9fx-74rv"/>
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